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ABSTRACT
Unlike telephone operators, which pay termination fees to
reach the users of another network, Internet Content Providers
(CPs) do not pay the Internet Service Providers (ISPs) of
users they reach. While the consequent cross subsidization
to CPs has nurtured content innovations at the edge of the
Internet, it reduces the investment incentives for the access
ISPs to expand capacity. As potential charges for terminat-
ing CPs’ traffic are criticized under the net neutrality debate,
we propose to allow CPs to voluntarily subsidize the usage-
based fees induced by their content traffic for end-users. We
model the regulated subsidization competition among CPs
under a neutral network and show how deregulation of sub-
sidization could increase an access ISP’s utilization and rev-
enue, strengthening its investment incentives. Although the
competition might harm certain CPs, we find that the main
cause comes from high access prices rather than the exis-
tence of subsidization. Our results suggest that subsidization
competition will increase the competitiveness and welfare of
the Internet content market; however, regulators might need
to regulate access prices if the access ISP market is not com-
petitive enough. We envision that subsidization competition
could become a viable model for the future Internet.
1. INTRODUCTION
Driven by bandwidth-intensive video applications and per-
vasive Internet access via mobile devices, Internet inter-domain
traffic has been growing more than 50% per annum [20] and
is expected to grow more than 100% per annum for mobile
networks [34]. To sustain such rapid traffic growth, Inter-
net Service Providers (ISPs), especially the mobile access
ISPs, need to upgrade their network infrastructures and ex-
pand capacities. However, revenues from online services are
growing more than twice as fast as those from Internet ac-
cess [34], whose market capitalizations have stagnated as
investors weigh high capital requirements against continued
margin pressure. This raises serious challenges regarding the
viability of the current Internet model in the future. The fun-
damental problem lies in the two-sided market structure [5,
36] of the Internet, where the ISPs provide a platform con-
necting end-users to the Internet Content Providers (CPs).
The CP-side transit ISPs are often the backbone ISPs that
Figure 1: Subsidization in a two-sided Internet market.
provide IP transit services. Due to market competition, re-
cent years have witnessed a constant decrease in IP tran-
sit prices [32]. The more serious problem lies in the last-
mile connections toward the end-users, which are often the
bottlenecks of the Internet [10]. For these last-mile access
ISPs, including the mobile providers, the main source of rev-
enue is from their end-users. Traditionally, they also need
to pay transit ISPs for transit services, although settlement-
free peering is common in practice. Existing proposals to
resolve this issue include: 1) allowing ISPs to impose termi-
nation fees [6] on CPs’ traffic towards their end-users, and 2)
allowing ISPs to prioritize traffic, differentiate services and
thus charge users non-uniformly. However, both proposals
have triggered a heated debate over network neutrality [44,
11], whose advocates argue that zero-pricing [22] and the
neutrality of physical networks are needed to protect and en-
courage content innovations of the Internet. After all, the
limited capacities and rising access costs will dampen user
demand, if CPs cannot return the created value to ISPs.
Traditionally, wireline access ISPs charge flat-rate prices
and implicitly subsidize CPs for content delivery; however,
usage-based pricing is commonly used by wireless providers.
The FCC chairman has recently backed usage-based pric-
ing for broadband to penalize heavy Internet users [18, 37]
and major U.S. broadband providers, e.g., Verizon [38] and
AT&T [42], have adopted tiered schemes where charges are
imposed to the metered usage above a predefined data cap.
We assume the adoption of usage-based pricing by access
ISPs, under which heavy users share the burden of subsidiz-
ing CPs. Our goal is to realign the created value and stim-
ulate the needed investment in the Internet value chain and
our high-level idea is illustrated in Figure 1, where we pro-
pose to allow CPs to voluntarily subsidize the usage-based
access costs caused by their content traffic, partially or fully,
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for the end-users. Our solution modularizes the issue along
the tussle boundary such that the physical network is kept
neutral while innovative competition among CPs is enabled
at higher service layers so as to incentivize ISP investments.
As a special case of full subsidization, AT&T’s recent spon-
sored data [1] plan will likely be available by the end of
2014. Nevertheless, it raised concerns over anti-competitive
practices, and the FCC says that they will be monitoring and
prepared to intervene if necessary [30].
To understand and demonstrate the potential impact of
subsidization, we take an analytical approach as no market
data is available for an empirical study yet. We develop a
macroscopic Internet model and study the status quo one-
sided pricing of the access ISPs in Section 3. Building upon
this framework, we model the policy that regulates subsi-
dization and analyze the competition game among CPs in
Section 4. We evaluate the policy implications on the ISP’s
revenue and system welfare in Section 5 and discuss the reg-
ulatory and implementation issues, as well as the limitations
of our model in Section 6. Our analytical results include:
• We characterize the impact of capacity, user population
(Theorem 1) and one-sided ISP pricing (Theorem 2) on
the system utilization and the CPs’ throughput.
• We analyze the CPs’ subsidization competition game
and characterize the Nash equilibrium (Theorem 3), its
uniqueness and its dynamics (Theorem 4 and 6).
• We characterize the impact of subsidization policy on
the CPs’ throughput, user population, and the system’s
utilization (Theorem 8) and welfare (Corollary 2).
Through our theoretical results and qualitative evaluations,
we also identify important policy implications as follows.
• If allowed, profitable CPs tend to subsidize users more
(Theorem 5) and achieve higher throughput (Lemma
3), leading to higher system welfare (Corollary 2).
• For fixed ISP pricing, deregulation of subsidization will
increase the utilization and revenue of the access ISPs
(Corollary 1), strengthening their investment incentives.
• Although the throughput of certain CPs might decrease,
this mainly comes from the ISP’s high price (Theorem
8) rather than the deregulation of subsidization.
In short, subsidization provides a feedback channel for
the highly profitable CPs to repay their users and indirectly
transfer value to the access ISPs. It helps the access ISPs at-
tract investment for capacity expansion while keeping their
physical networks neutral. Our results suggest that regu-
lators should promote this subsidization competition; how-
ever, they might need to regulate the ISP’s pricing if the ac-
cess market is not competitive enough. We envision that sub-
sidization competition could become a viable model for the
future Internet so as to accommodate the growing demand
for data traffic.
2. RELATED WORK
A report from A.T. Kearney [34] studied the performance,
economic and policy pressures of the Internet and identified
four models for the future Internet: 1) modification of retail
pricing schemes, 2) traffic-dependent charges, 3) enhanced-
quality services over the public Internet, and 4) bilateral ser-
vice agreements. We discuss the above existing models and
their relationships with our subsidization competition model.
2.1 Modification of Retail Pricing Schemes
Historically, the Internet adopted flat-rate prices [33, 39]
for simplicity. Economists [26] and computer scientists [9,
17, 19] advocated usage-based pricing, which was shown to
provide congestion control [17], quality of service [19] and
economic efficiency [9], and is adopted by mobile providers
[28]. Subsidization competition assumes the adoption of
usage-based pricing by access ISPs, under which the con-
sumers’ usage-based charges could be subsidized by the CPs.
2.2 Imposition of Termination Fees on CPs
One core question under the net neutrality debate [44] is
whether ISPs should be allowed to use two-sided pricing and
charge CPs for terminating their content traffic. Prior work
[7, 29, 31] studied the investment incentives in Internet-like
two-sided markets and drew different conclusions. Njoroge
et al. [31] found that through CP-side pricing, ISPs could
extract higher surplus and maintain higher investment levels.
However, Choi et al. [7] found that expending capacity will
decrease the CP-side sale price. Musacchio et al. [29] found
that although the returns on investment under one-sided or
two-sided pricings are comparable, the size of investment
and profit depend on the advertising rates and users’ price
sensitivity. From an economic efficiency point of view, [31]
concluded that two-sided pricing results in higher social wel-
fare; however, Lee and Wu [22] argued that the zero pricing
at the CP-side could be optimal in theory [5, 36]. Also, [7]
found that the short-run welfare is higher under one-sided
neutral regulation. Our subsidization mechanism does not
impose charges on the CPs by the ISPs, but provides an
indirect mechanism for them to voluntarily return the zero-
pricing subsidy back to the ISPs via their end-users.
2.3 Differentiated Services over the Internet
Another core debate under net neutrality is whether ISPs
should be allowed to differentiate services and prices. Wu
[44] surveyed the discriminatory practices of broadband op-
erators and proposed solutions to manage bandwidth and po-
lice ISPs. Sidak [41] focused on consumer utility and ar-
gued that differential pricing is essential to maximize utility.
Shetty et al. [40] considered a two-class service model and
studied capacity planning, regulation, as well as differenti-
ated pricing to consumers. Economides et al. [13] com-
pared various regulations for quality of service and price
discrimination, and drew conclusions about desirable regula-
tion regimes. As net neutrality is undergoing heated debate,
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regulation of desirable differentiation is a rich area for fur-
ther study. Under our solution, ISPs do not make any physi-
cal or economic differentiation and CPs’ subsidies are made
voluntarily. Subsidization serves as a policy mechanism that
encourages competition and provides investment incentives
and economic efficiency for the Internet ecosystem.
2.4 Bilateral Settlements for Valued Services
A fundamental cause of investment shortage is the mis-
alignment between the value created and the revenue ob-
tained in the Internet value chain. Clark et al. [8] discussed
various economic tussles among the ISPs, CPs and users.
Ma et al. [23] advocated the use of the Shapley profit-sharing
mechanism for multi-lateral ISP settlements and studied bi-
lateral implementations [24]. Laskowski [21] identified that
the network’s lack of accountability is an obstacle to imple-
ment desirable contracting systems for the Internet. Because
accounting of traffic towards the end-users is feasible for ac-
cess ISPs, our subsidization mechanism can be regarded as
a contracting system between the CPs and access ISPs, even
through they might not be directly connected to each other.
Through the feedback channel from CPs to end-users, subsi-
dization provide a new avenue for the Internet ecosystem to
realign the profit distribution among different stakeholders.
3. MACROSCOPIC INTERNET MODEL
To understand the implications of policy on the Internet,
we start with a macroscopic model that captures the physical
and business dynamics in the status quo Internet among an
access ISP, its users and the CPs used by these consumers.
3.1 Basic Physical System Model
We denote µ as the capacity of an access ISP serving the
users of a certain geographical region and N as the set of
CPs used by the ISP’s consumers. For each CP i ∈ N , we
denote mi as its user population and define θi , miλi as its
total throughput, where λi denotes the CP’s average per user
throughput. We define θ ,
∑
k∈N θk as the aggregate sys-
tem throughput. Under any fixed capacity µ and aggregate
throughput θ, we define φ , Φ(θ, µ) as the system utiliza-
tion, a function of θ and µ. We assume the average user
throughput is a function of the utilization, i.e., λi , λi(φ).
Assumption 1. Φ(θ, µ) and any λi(φ) are differentiable.
Φ(θ, µ) is strictly decreasing in µ, strictly increasing in θ
and satisfies limθ→0 Φ(θ, µ) = 0 for all µ > 0. λi(φ) is
strictly decreasing in φ and satisfies limφ→∞ λi(φ) = 0.
Assumption 1 captures the physics of capacity utilization:
utilization increases when the system accommodates higher
throughput or has less capacity, and vice-versa. Because the
system utilization and congestion are two sides of the same
coin (congestion happens when the system is over-utilized),
it also captures the physics of user throughput: users achieve
higher throughput when the system is less congested.
We denotem as the vector of user populations of the CPs.
Figure 2 illustrates our basic model (m, µ), where the user
Figure 2: The basic system model (m, µ).
populations m and system capacity µ collectively determine
the system utilization φ and each CP i’s throughput θi. Be-
cause utilization increases with the accommodated through-
put, which decreases with the utilization (congestion), the
resulting system utilization should be in an equilibrium.
Definition 1 (UTILIZATION). φ is the utilization of a sys-
tem (m, µ) if it satisfies the following condition:
φ = Φ
(∑
k∈N
mkλk(φ), µ
)
. (1)
Definition 1 states that the utilization φ should induce the
aggregate system throughput θ =
∑
k∈N mkλk(φ) such that
it leads to exactly the same level of utilization φ = Φ(θ, µ).
We define Θ(φ, µ) , Φ−1(φ, µ) as the inverse function of
Φ(θ, µ) with respect to φ. Θ(φ, µ) can be interpreted as the
implied amount of throughput that induces a utilization level
φ for a system with capacity µ. By Assumption 1, Θ(φ, µ)
is strictly increasing in both φ and µ. To characterize the
utilization of a system (m, µ), we define a gap function g(φ)
between the supply and demand of throughput under a fixed
level of utilization φ as g(φ) , Θ (φ, µ)−∑k∈N mkλk(φ).
Lemma 1. Given fixed capacity µ and user populations m,
g(φ) is a strictly increasing function of φ. The system oper-
ates at a unique level of utilization φ, which solves g(φ) = 0.
Lemma 1 characterizes the uniqueness of the system uti-
lization φ under which the throughput supply Θ(φ, µ) equals
the aggregate throughput demand
∑
k∈N mkλk(φ). Based
on Lemma 1, for any system (m, µ), we denote φ(m, µ) as
its unique system utilization and θi(m, µ) as CP i’s corre-
sponding throughput, i.e., θi(m, µ) , miλi (φ(m, µ)).
We define the marginal change of the throughput gap g(φ)
due to the marginal change in the system utilization φ as
dg
dφ
, ∂Θ(φ, µ)
∂φ
−
∑
k∈N
mk
dλk(φ)
dφ
> 0, (2)
where the first term (second summation) captures the change
of throughput in supply (total demand). We characterize the
impact of user population mi and capacity µ on the utiliza-
tion φ and throughput θi, as a function of dg/dφ as follows.
Theorem 1 (CAPACITY AND USER EFFECT). The system
utilization φ decreases if the capacity µ increases or any
user population mi decreases. In particular, we have
∂φ
∂µ
= −
(
dg
dφ
)−1
∂Θ(φ, µ)
∂µ
< 0, (3)
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and
∂φ
∂mi
=
(
dg
dφ
)−1
λi > 0, ∀i ∈ N . (4)
Any CP i’s throughput θi increases with capacity µ and its
user populationmi; however, the increase inmi reduces the
throughput θj of all other CPs j 6= i. In particular,
∂θi
∂µ
= mi
dλi
dφ
∂φ
∂mi
> 0,
∂θi
∂mi
= λi +mi
dλi
dφ
∂φ
∂mi
> 0
and
∂θj
∂mi
= mj
dλj
dφ
∂φ
∂mi
< 0, ∀j 6= i.
Theorem 1 intuitively states that 1) when the system ca-
pacity becomes more abundant, the throughput of any CP
increases and the system utilization decreases, and 2) when
more users of a CP join the system, the system utilization
and the throughput of that CP increase, while that of any
other CP decreases. Equation (3) explicitly shows that the
capacity effect on the system utilization can be expressed as
its impact on the feasible system throughput ∂Θ(φ, µ)/∂µ,
normalized by dg/dφ, which re-balances the supply and de-
mand of throughput so as to fill the throughput gap g(·) un-
der the new system utilization. Similarly in Equation (4),
λi can be interpreted as the marginal increase in throughput
when a new user of CP i joins the system. It also implies
that the user impact on the utilization is proportional to the
per user throughput, i.e., ∂φ/∂mi : ∂φ/∂mj = λi : λj .
CPs’ throughput depends on whether their users are sensi-
tive to congestion. This can be characterized by utilization-
elasticity of throughput or φ-elasticity of λi, defined as λiφ .
Definition 2 (ELASTICITY). The elasticity of y with re-
spect to x, or x-elasticity of y, yx is defined as 
y
x ,
∂y
∂x
x
y
.
Elasticity is often expressed as yx = (∂y/y)/(∂x/x) and
interpreted as the percentage change in y (the numerator) in
respond to the percentage change in x (the denominator). In
particular, λiφ captures the percentage change in λi in re-
spond to the percentage change in the system utilization φ.
Lemma 2. If CP i is replaced by a new CP j which satisfies
mjλj(0) = miλi(0) and 
λj
φ (φ) = 
λi
φ (φ) for all φ > 0,
then the system utilization does not change.
Lemma 2 characterizes CPs’ throughput by φ-elasticity.
Mathematically, by keeping the same elasticity λiφ , we could
scale up the maximum throughput λi(0) by λ˜i(0) = κλi(0)
and scale downmi by m˜i = κ−1mi for some constant κ > 0
without affecting the system utilization φ and the throughput
of all other CPs. Operationally, it implies that we could treat
the traffic of a CP i as if it has a single big user, i.e., m˜i = 1,
with the maximum throughput λ˜i(0) = miλi(0). It also im-
plies that for multiple CPs, e.g., a set S ⊂ N , with the same
φ-elasticity of throughput, we could conceptually aggregate
them as a single CP k with parameters mk and λk(0) that
satisfy mkλk(0) =
∑
i∈S miλi(0). By this result, we will
use a single CP to model a group of CPs that have similar
traffic characteristics in our later numerical evaluations.
3.2 One-Sided ISP Pricing
In the current Internet, most access ISPs only charge their
end-users. We denote ti as the per-unit usage charge for the
data traffic of CP i. We assume that CP i’s user population
mi is a function of its per-unit charge ti, i.e., mi = mi(ti).
Assumption 2. mi(ti) is continuously differentiable and de-
creasing with limti→∞mi(ti) = 0.
Assumption 2 states that the user demand decreases with
the per-unit charge on the content traffic. This model is quite
general and coincides with existing models [5, 36] where
the heterogeneity of users are modeled by the distribution
of their valuations on data traffic and only the users whose
valuations are higher than ti consume data traffic from CP i.
Because traffic from different CPs should not be differ-
entiated under net neutrality, ISPs often impose a uniform
charge. We denote p as this uniform charge for all types of
traffic. When CPs do not provide subsidies, we have ti = p
for any i ∈ N . We define the ISP’s revenue as R , pθ =
p
∑
i∈N miλi and each CP i’s utility as Ui = viθi, where
vi denotes CP i’s average per-unit traffic profit. Because the
price p affects the user demand m, we extend our basic sys-
tem model to capture the one-sided ISP pricing as follows.
Figure 3: The system model with one-sided ISP pricing.
Figure 3 shows that the user populations m are influenced
by the price p, and that the utilization φ affects the ISP’s
revenue R = p
∑
i∈N miλi(φ). ISPs can use revenue as
feedback to guide their pricing and capacity decisions; how-
ever, CPs’ utilities are determined by throughput, which they
have no means to influence in the one-sided pricing model.
Because ti = p for any CP i, by Assumption 2, we express
the user populations as a function of price as m = m(p).
For a fixed capacity µ, we define φ(p) , φ(m(p), µ) as the
utilization of system (m(p), µ) and θi(p) , mi(p)λi (φ(p))
as the corresponding throughput of CP i under price p. By
Assumption 1 and 2, both φ(p) and θi(p) are differentiable
functions of p. We characterize the impact of price p on the
system utilization φ and each CP i’s throughput θi in the
following theorem. The price’s impact on Ui is simply its
impact on θi scaled by vi and we will study its impact on the
revenue R under a more general setting in Section 5.
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Theorem 2 (PRICE EFFECT). The system utilization φ de-
creases with the price p. In particular, we have
∂φ
∂p
=
(
dg
dφ
)−1 ∑
k∈N
dmk
dp
λk ≤ 0. (5)
The aggregate throughput θ decreases with the price p,
∂θ
∂p
=
∂Θ
∂φ
(
∂Θ
∂φ
−
∑
i∈N
mi
dλi
dφ
)−1∑
i∈N
dmi
dp
λi ≤ 0, (6)
and any CP i’s throughput θi increases with p if and only if
mip /
λi
φ < −φp . (7)
Theorem 2 states that when the price increases, due to its
direct impact on decreasing the user demand, the system uti-
lization decreases, which implies that the aggregate through-
put of all the CPs also decreases. Similar to (3) and (4), the
price effect on the system utilization can be expressed as its
impact on the aggregate throughput dθ/dp, normalized by
dg/dφ in Equation (5). However, a CP i’s throughput might
increase or decrease, depending on its utilization elasticity
of (per user) throughput λiφ and price elasticity of user de-
mand mip , i.e., the percentage change in the population mi
in response to the percentage change in price p. In partic-
ular, θi increases with p if its users are less price-sensitive
and more congestion-sensitive, i.e., |mip | is small and |λiφ |
is large. Notice that the right hand side of (7) measures the
overall impact of price on the system utilization.
To understand the price effect more intuitively, we illus-
trate a numerical example as follows. We consider a uti-
lization function Φ(θ, µ) = θ/µ, which uses per capacity
throughput as the metric for system utilization. We consider
the forms of throughput λi(φ) = e−βiφ and user demand
mi(ti) = e
−αiti that satisfy Assumption 1 and 2. Un-
der these exponential forms, the φ-elasticity of throughput
λiφ equals −βiφ and the p-elasticity of user population mip
equals −αip. Based on the above setting, we can express
a CP i’s throughput as θi = e−(αip+βiφ), where αi and βi
neatly characterize θi’s sensitivity to price and congestion,
respectively. We obtain dg/dφ = µ+
∑
i∈N βiθi and
∂φ
∂p
=
(
dg
dφ
)−1(∑
i∈N
dmi
dp
λi
)
= −
∑
i∈N αiθi
µ+
∑
i∈N βiθi
.
By Theorem 2, throughput θi increases at price p if
αip
βiφ
<
∑
j∈N αjθj
µ+
∑
k∈N βkθk
. (8)
We set the system capacity to be µ = 1 and consider a set of
9 types of CPs with values of (αi, βi) chosen from {1, 3, 5}.
Figure 4 plots the aggregate throughput θ (left) and the
ISP’s revenue R (right) as a function of price p that varies
along the x-axis. We observe that the aggregate throughput
decreases with the price as indicated by Theorem 2; how-
ever, the revenue R = pθ depends on both the price and
aggregate throughput and shows a single-peak pattern.
Figure 4: Aggregate throughput θ and ISP’s revenue R.
Figure 5: Throughput θi of different CPs.
Figure 5 shows the throughput θi of the 9 individual CPs
as a function of the price p in each sub-figure, respectively.
In general, the throughput is low with large values of αi and
βi (the lower and right sub-figures), because the user popu-
lation is more sensitive to price and the per user throughput
is more sensitive to congestion. By Theorem 2, when p in-
creases, φ decreases, and therefore (αi/βi)(p/φ) increases.
As indicated by condition (8), each θi decreases with p even-
tually; however, when p is small, we observe that the CPs
with a small ratio of αi/βi (the upper and right sub-figures)
demonstrate an increasing trend in throughput. Intuitively,
for these CPs, the increase in the per user throughput λi is
much higher than the decrease in the user population mi so
that the aggregate throughput θi could still increase.
Regulatory Implications: Under the existing one-sided
pricing, an increase in the access ISP’s price reduces the
user demand (by Assumption 2), and consequently reduces
the system utilization and the total system throughput (by
Theorem 2). Regulators might want to regulate the price of
an access ISP if its high price induces low utilization and
drives the total system throughput too low (shown in Fig-
ure 4). However, as the existing wireless capacities of many
carriers are often under-provisioned and highly-loaded, and
regulations will further limit the ISPs’ profit margin, we do
not see the need for price regulation under the status quo.
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4. SUBSIDIZATION COMPETITION
As the access ISPs can neither differentiate services nor
charge CPs in the one-sided pricing model in Figure 3, the
limited profit margin does not provide enough investment in-
centive for them to expand capacities. Neither do the CPs
have any means to express preferences and improve their
utilities. In this section, we propose to create a feedback
channel for the CPs to influence the system by allowing them
to voluntarily subsidize the usage-based fees for their users.
4.1 The Subsidization Competition Model
We denote q ≥ 0 as a subsidization policy that limits the
maximum subsidy allowed. We denote si ∈ [0, q] as the per-
unit usage subsidy provided by CP i for its content traffic for
users. We denote s as the vector of subsidies of the CPs. We
extend the definition of CP i’s utility as Ui , (vi − si)θi.
Figure 6: One-sided ISP pricing with CP subsidization.
Figure 6 illustrates the extended model where subsidiza-
tion from CPs is allowed. In this model, each CP i could
strategically choose its subsidy si to influence its throughput
θi via its user population mi so as to optimize its utility Ui.
Regulators can also use a certain welfare metric W to deter-
mine the desirable policy regime q for the Internet industry.
Under price p and subsidies s, user populationmi satisfies
mi(ti) = mi(p − si). Given any fixed ISP decision (p, µ),
we denote φ(s) , φ(m(p, s), µ) as the system utilization
and define θi(s) = mi(p−si)λi (φ(s)) as CP i’s throughput.
Lemma 3. For any s′i > si, let s′ = (s′i, s−i) and s =
(si, s−i) for some fixed strategy profile s−i. For any price p,
φ(s′) ≥ φ(s), θi(s′) ≥ θi(s) and θj(s′) ≤ θj(s), ∀j 6= i.
Lemma 3 states that if a CP i unilaterally increases its
subsidy si, its throughput θi and the system utilization φ in-
crease; however, the throughput of any other CP decreases.
It shows that the subsidization mechanism creates a com-
petitive game among the CPs, where each CP i could use
subsidy si to maximize its utility Ui. Notice that besides the
policy constraint q, each CP’s optimal subsidy strategy de-
pends on all other CPs’ strategies as well as the ISP’s price
p. In this section, we study the policy implications of sub-
sidization and therefore, we often assume a fixed price p for
the access ISP. This setting corresponds to a competitive ac-
cess market where the ISPs cannot easily manipulate prices,
or a case where the ISP’s price is regulated. We will study an
ISP’s pricing strategy, its revenue and the policy implication
on the system welfare in the next section.
Definition 3 (NASH EQUILIBRIUM). Given any fixed ISP
price p and policy q, a strategy profile s is a Nash equilib-
rium if each si solves CP i’s utility maximization problem:
max Ui(si; s−i) = (vi − si)θi(s)
subject to 0 ≤ si ≤ q.
We characterize the Nash equilibrium of the subsidization
competition game in the following theorem.
Theorem 3 (CHARACTERIZATION). For any fixed p and
q, a strategy profile s is a Nash equilibrium only if
si = min{τi(s), q}, ∀ i ∈ N ,
where each τi denotes a threshold for CP i, defined by
τi(s) , (vi − si) misi
(
1 + λiφ 
φ
mi
)
. (9)
In particular, vi ≤ (∂θi/∂si)−1 θi holds if si = 0. More-
over, if Ui(s) = Ui(si, s−i) is concave in si for all i ∈ N ,
then the above conditions are also sufficient.
Theorem 3 characterizes the Nash equilibrium in two ways.
First, it indicates that any CP i does not subsidize if its prof-
itability vi is lower than (∂θi/∂si)−1θi. Second, if the pol-
icy constraint is not tight, i.e., si < q, the equilibrium sub-
sidy si can be characterized by its profit margin vi − si and
the elasticity metrics misi , 
λi
φ and 
φ
mi . Equation (9) can also
be written as τi(s) = (vi−si)θisi = (vi−si)misi
(
1 + λimi
)
.
This characterization also implies that a CP would subsidize
its users more if 1) its traffic profitability vi (and therefore its
profit margin vi−si) increases, or 2) its throughput elasticity
θisi or user demand elasticity of subsidy 
mi
si increases.
By Assumption 1 and 2, each Ui(s) is differentiable in s.
For any strategy profile s, we define u(s) = {ui(s) : i ∈ N}
as the vector of marginal utilities, where each ui(s) denotes
the marginal utility of CP i, defined as ui(s) , ∂Ui(s)/∂si.
Next, we characterize the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium
based on a condition on the marginal utilities u(s).
Theorem 4 (UNIQUENESS). For any fixed price p and pol-
icy q, if for any distinct pair of feasible strategy profiles
s′ 6= s, there always exist a CP i ∈ N such that
(s′i − si) (ui(s′)− ui(s)) < 0, (10)
then there always exists a unique Nash equilibrium.
Technically, the above sufficient condition for uniqueness
requires−u to be a P -function [27]. Notice that this unique-
ness property holds for any subsetQ ⊂ [0, q]|N | of the strat-
egy space if condition (10) holds in the domain Q.
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4.2 Dynamics of Subsidies in Equilibrium
Since a Nash equilibrium is defined under a fixed price p
and policy q by Definition (3), we use s = s(p, q) to indicate
a Nash equilibrium under p and q. Equation (9) in Theorem
3 hinted that a CP with higher profitability subsidizes users
more in an equilibrium. We formally show this as follows.
Theorem 5 (PROFITABILITY EFFECT ON SUBSIDY). If a
CP i’s profitability increases from vi to vˆi unilaterally, and
under the condition (10) of Theorem 4, s and sˆ are the cor-
responding Nash equilibria, then we must have sˆi ≥ si.
If a CP’s profitability increases, Theorem 5 tells that it will
increase its subsidy in equilibrium, and hints that its through-
put will increase by Lemma 3. Through subsidization, CPs
can respond to their profitability and influence throughput.
After analyzing the impact of CPs’ profitability, we study
how an equilibrium s(p, q) is influenced by the price p and
policy q. We define N− and N+ as the set of CPs whose
subsidies are 0 and q, respectively, and N˜ = N\(N− ∪
N+) as the remaining set of CPs whose subsidies are strictly
positive and less than q. We define s˜ and u˜ as the subsidies
and marginal utilities of the set N˜ of CPs.
Theorem 6 (EQUILIBRIUM DYNAMICS). If a Nash equi-
librium s satisfies 1) i ∈ N˜ if ui(s) = 0, and 2) the condition
(10) for a neighborhood of R|N | centered at s in the strat-
egy space, then in a neighborhood of (p, q), a unique Nash
equilibrium is a differentiable function s(p, q), satisfying
∂si
∂q
=

0 if i ∈ N−;
1 if i ∈ N+;
−
∑
k∈N˜
ψik
∑
j∈N+
∂uk
∂sj
, if i ∈ N˜ , (11)
and
∂si
∂p
=

0 if i /∈ N˜ ;
−
∑
k∈N˜
ψik
∂uk
∂p
, if i ∈ N˜ , (12)
where Ψ = {ψij} , (∇s˜u˜)−1, i.e., ψij is at the ith row and
jth column of the inverse of the Jacobian matrix∇s˜u˜.
Theorem 6 states that a marginal change in the ISP’s price
or the regulatory policy will not affect the behavior of the
set N− and N+ of CPs: the CPs who do not subsidize re-
main the same and the CPs who subsidize the amount q keep
subsidizing at the maximum level as q increases. When p
changes, the set N˜ of CPs readjust subsidies among them-
selves in a new equilibrium such that their marginal utilities
remain zero in (12); when q changes, since the set N+ of
CPs increase subsidies accordingly, their impacts have to be
counted in the new equilibrium in (11). By applying the
KKT condition to Definition 3, we know ui(s) = 0 for all
i ∈ N˜ , and the first condition of Theorem 6 is a bit stronger
which guarantees that the equilibrium s is regular, i.e., lo-
cally differentiable. The second condition only assumes (10)
locally, which guarantees the local uniqueness of equilib-
rium in a neighborhood centered at s by Theorem 4.
Corollary 1 (DEREGULATION). Under a fixed ISP price
p and the conditions of Theorem 6, in a neighborhood of q,
we can express φ(q) and R(q) as the system utilization and
the ISP’s revenue under the Nash equilibrium s(q). If u is
off-diagonally monotone, i.e., ∂ui(s)/∂sj ≥ 0 for all i 6= j,
∂φ
∂q
≥ 0, ∂R
∂q
≥ 0 and ∂si
∂q
≥ 0, ∀i ∈ N .
The off-diagonally monotone property makes −u to be a
Leontief type [15] of P -matrix, which guarantees the stabil-
ity of a macroeconomic system due to Wassily Leontief [16].
Intuitively, it assumes although the utility of a CP i decreases
when other CPs increase their subsidies, its marginal bene-
fit of subsidizing its own users, i.e., ui, increases. Corollary
1 states that under this stability condition, when allowed to
subsidize more, CPs will increase subsidies, which will lead
to an increase in the system utilization and the ISP’s revenue.
Regulatory Implications: Under a competitive or price
regulated access market, deregulation of subsidization en-
courages CPs to subsidize users (by Theorem 5 and 6), and
consequently increases the system utilization and the ISPs’
revenue (by Corollary 1). CPs’ user populations m increase
because the usage charges become cheaper after subsidiza-
tion (by Assumption 2), but the induced higher utilization
(by Theorem 1) might cause congestion. The total system
throughput also increases (implied by Corollary 1 as φ in-
creases), while the throughput of certain CPs might decrease.
However, this is caused by the negative network externality,
i.e., the physics of congestion of shared capacity. Although
it might be unfavorable for the CPs whose traffic is more
congestion sensitive in the short term, as the ISPs improve
profit margins from higher utilization, they will have more
incentives to expand capacities so as to accommodate more
traffic and relieve congestion in the long term.
5. ISP REVENUE AND SYSTEM WELFARE
Although the policy q, the price p and the subsidies s
all impact the system, these decisions are not made simul-
taneously and independently. The system is fundamentally
driven by a regulatory policy q, under which the ISP deter-
mines its price p(q) and then the CPs respond with strategies
s(p, q). Theorem 6 characterizes the dynamics of s(p, q) and
Corollary 1 characterizes the impact of policy q when p is
fixed. In practice, ISPs often use price to optimize revenue,
and by Theorem 6 the subsidies s are also influenced by p.
In this section, we study the impact of the ISP’s price on its
revenue and the impact of policy on the system welfare when
the response of ISP’s pricing is taken into account.
5.1 Impact of ISP’s Pricing on Its Revenue
Under a fixed policy q, by Theorem 6, we can write s(p) as
the induced subsidies under price p. Thus, the induced sys-
tem utilization is φ(s(p)) and the ISP’s induced revenue is
R(p) = p
∑
i∈N θi(p) = p
∑
i∈N mi(p−si(p))λi(φ(s(p))).
7
Theorem 7 (MARGINAL REVENUE). If the ISP’s revenue
is differentiable at p, then its marginal revenue is
dR(p)
dp
=
∑
i∈N
θi + Υ
∑
i∈N
mip θi, (13)
where Υ and the mi-elasticity of price p satisfy
Υ = 1 +
∑
j∈N
λjmj and 
mi
p =
p
mi
dmi
dti
(
1− ∂si
∂p
)
.
Theorem 7 characterizes the change in revenue as the price
varies and isolates the effect of subsidization into the elastic-
ities mip , where ∂si/∂p plays a role. It also generalizes the
case of one-sided pricing, i.e., ∂si/∂p = 0 for all i ∈ N .
The second term in (13) measures the price’s impact on the
aggregate throughput, i.e., p(∂θ/∂p), which can be factor-
ized by Υ, a parameter determined by the physical model in
Figure 2, because λjmj can be decomposed as φmj 
λj
φ and
φmj 
λj
φ =
mj
λj
dλj
dφ
∂φ
∂mj
= mj
dλj
dφ
(
dg
dφ
)−1
. (14)
5.2 Impact of Regulatory Policy on Welfare
By Theorem 7, we understand how the ISP’s pricing af-
fects its revenue. We assume that the ISP would adapt its
price p as a function of a given policy q. The next theorem
captures the impact of the policy q on the system states, i.e.,
φ, mi and θi, where the responses of both the ISP’s price
p(q) and the CPs’ subsidies s(p, q) are taken into account.
Theorem 8 (POLICY EFFECT). If the ISP’s price is a dif-
ferentiable function p(q) of policy q and s is a Nash equi-
librium of p(q) and q, under the conditions of Theorem 6, in
a neighborhood of q, we can express the Nash equilibrium
as s(q) , s (p(q), q). The corresponding system utilization
φ(q), user population mi(q) and throughput λi(q) satisfy
dmi
dq
=
dmi
dti
dti
dq
=
dmi
dti
((
1− ∂si
∂p
)
dp
dq
− ∂si
∂q
)
, (15)
dφ
dq
=
(
dg
dφ
)−1∑
i∈N
dmi
dq
λi and
dλi
dq
=
dλi
dφ
dφ
dq
. (16)
Any CP i’s throughput θi increases with q if and only if
miti 
ti
q /
λi
φ < −φq . (17)
Theorem 8 shows that the policy effect on utilization dφ/dq
in (16) and the condition (17) for throughput θi have similar
forms as the price effect dφ/dp in (5) and the condition (7).
This is because the policy effect is carried out by its impact
on the user populations, i.e., miq = 
mi
ti 
ti
q , via its impact on
the price and subsidies. By Assumption 1 and 2, both λiφ and
miti are negative. Inequality (17) tells that a CP’s through-
put decreases if any only if (−miti )(−tiq ) < −λiφ φq , which
implies that the subsidy could help increase throughput via
(−tiq ); however, (−miti ) could be decreased due to the ISP’s
increasing price, which will reduce the CP’s throughput.
Corollary 2 (POLICY IMPACT ON WELFARE). Under the
conditions of Theorem 8, let W (q) ,
∑
i∈N θi(q)vi define
the system welfare. Suppose dφ/dq in (16) is positive, then
the marginal welfare dW/dq is positive if and only if∑
i∈N
wi∑
k∈N wk
vi >
∑
i∈N
−λimivi, where wi , λi
dmi
dq
.
We measure the system welfare in terms of the gross profit
W =
∑
i∈N θivi of all the CPs for two reasons. First, it in-
ternalizes the subsidy transfer from CPs to ISP. Second, be-
cause CP profits are often positively correlated to their val-
ues to users, it also serves an estimate for user welfare. In
Corollary 2, wivi can be interpreted as the increase in wel-
fare due to the policy’s impact on the user population mi,
and therefore, the left side of the inequality represents the
normalized increase in welfare due to the changes in the user
populations. The right side of the inequality represents the
normalized decrease in welfare due to the policy’s impact on
each average throughput λi via mi. Corollary 2 states that
the welfare increases if and only if the increasing compo-
nent is larger than the decreasing component. Notice that the
decreasing component only depends on the physical charac-
teristics (14) of the CPs, while the weight wi/
∑
j∈N wj for
each vi tends to be large if vi is large, because profitable CPs
will have stronger tendencies to subsidize their users so as to
attract a larger population mi.
To understand the policy effect more intuitively, we per-
form a numerical evaluation as follows. We use the same set-
ting mi(ti) = e−αiti , λi(φ) = e−βiφ and Φ(θ, µ) = θ/µ as
in Section 3. We model 8 types of CPs with αi, βi ∈ {2, 5}
and vi ∈ {0.5, 1}. By Lemma 2, each CP represents the ag-
gregation of a group of CPs with similar characteristics of
traffic and user demand. In each of the following figures, we
vary the policy q at 5 levels from 0 to 2.0 and vary the ISP’s
price p from 0 to 2 along the x-axis. When q = 0, the figures
show the baseline case where subsidization is not allowed.
Figure 7: ISP’s Revenue R and System Welfare W .
Figure 7 plots the ISP’s revenue R (left) and the system
welfare W (right). We observe that under any fixed price
p, both the ISP’s revenue and the system welfare are higher
when the CPs’ subsidization is less regulated, i.e., q is large.
However, if the deregulation of subsidization will trigger a
higher ISP price, it also shows that the system welfare will
decrease with the price p under any fixed policy q.
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Figure 8: The subsidies si of the 8 types of CPs under equilibrium.
Figure 9: The user population mi of the 8 types of CPs under equilibrium.
Figure 8 plots the subsidy si of the 8 types of CPs un-
der equilibrium. We observe that the CPs that have a higher
profitability, i.e., vi = 1 in the lower 4 sub-figures, or a
higher demand elasticity, i.e., αi = 5 in the right 4 sub-
figures, provide much higher subsidies compared to their
counterparts. We also observe that when the price p is small,
except for the two CPs with αi = 2 and vi = 0.5, most CPs
want to subsidize at the maximum level q constrained by the
policy; however, when p increases, subsidies may stay flat
and then decrease due to the decrease in profit margin. By
comparing Figure 8 with Figure 7, we observe that when
q = 2, the ISP maximizes its revenue by setting p a bit less
than 1, where the CPs’ subsidies are kept at a high level.
Figure 9 plots the corresponding user population mi of
the 8 types of CPs under equilibrium. We observe that when
p increases, the user populations of the CPs with higher de-
mand elasticity in the right 4 sub-figures decrease steeper
than those with lower demand elasticity. By comparing the
low-value CPs in the upper sub-figures with the high-value
CPs in the lower sub-figures, we observe that the user pop-
ulations of the high-value CPs decrease much slower so that
they can retain higher user populations via higher subsidies.
In all cases, we observe that CPs always obtain higher user
population under a more relaxed policy q.
Figure 10 plots the individual throughput θi of the 8 types
of CPs under equilibrium. In Figure 10, we observe that the
CPs with higher profitability, i.e., vi = 1, or lower conges-
tion elasticity, i.e., βi = 2, achieve higher throughput com-
pared to their counterparts. When comparing the throughput
with that of the baseline, i.e., q = 0, we observe that the
CPs with high profitability achieve higher throughput, with
the only exception for the case (αi, βi, vi) = (2, 5, 1) when
p is small. As p is small, the system attracts large user de-
mand and is relatively congested. Because this CP is more
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Figure 10: The throughput θi of the 8 types of CPs under equilibrium.
Figure 11: The utility Ui of the 8 types of CPs under equilibrium.
congestion sensitive, i.e., βi is large, and by Corollary 1,
subsidization will further increase the system utilization, its
throughput will be reduced. By comparing Figure 10 with
Figure 7, we observe that with higher throughput for the CPs
of higher profitability, the system welfare increases when the
policy q is relaxed.
Figure 11 plots the resulting utility Ui of the 8 types of
CPs under equilibrium. As the individual CP’s utility is de-
fined as Ui = (vi − si)θi, each Ui shows similar trends as
θi in Figure 10, which is scaled by its profit margin vi − si.
When q increases, we observe that 1) CPs with high demand
elasticity and value, i.e., αi = 5 and vi = 1, achieve higher
utility via higher subsidies, user population and throughput,
and 2) CPs with low demand elasticity and high congestion
elasticity, i.e., αi = 2 and βi = 5, achieve lower utility due
to the lower achievable throughput. The utilities of other
CPs under different policies are comparable.
Regulatory Implications: In a deregulated market where
CPs are allowed to subsidize their users, highly profitable
CPs will provide greater subsidies (by Theorem 5) and ob-
tain more users (by Assumption 2), achieving higher through-
put (by Theorem 1) and leading to a higher system welfare
(by Corollary 2). Due to negative network externality, some
CPs may obtain lower throughput; however, it can be re-
solved when ISPs obtain investment incentives and expand
capacity. Nonetheless, deregulation of subsidization might
trigger an increase in the ISP’s price, leading to a decrease
in the system welfare (shown in Figure 7). High ISP prices
also discourage user demand (by Assumption 2) and con-
sequently decrease their throughput (shown in Figure 10).
Our results suggest that the subsidization competition will
increase the ISP’s revenue and system welfare (by Corollary
1); however, price regulations might be needed if the access
market is not competitive and the ISP’s price is set too high.
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6. ISSUES AND MODEL LIMITATIONS
Subsidization works with the usage-based pricing schemes
of the access ISPs. For mobile providers, implementing data
caps and accounting for data traffic consumptions are com-
mon in practice. Broadband providers in countries like India
and Australia have been using usage-based pricing, and ma-
jor U.S. ISPs like Verizon [38] and AT&T [42] have also
adopted usage-based pricing after gaining support from the
FCC [37, 18]. To differentiate content and enable subsi-
dization from different CPs, platforms such as FreeBand [3]
have been developed to provide data traffic statistics to mo-
bile carriers so as to lower the bills of consumers, based on
the type of applications. AT&T’s recent sponsored data [1]
plan allows CPs to fully subsidize their users. Although our
model allows partial subsidization, its technical feasibility is
the same as the proposed sponsored data applications.
Deregulation of subsidization might reduce the through-
put of certain CPs, e.g., the upper-left ones in Figure 10.
These CPs either do not have incentives to subsidize, be-
cause their users are not price-sensitive, i.e., the elasticity
misi is small, or they cannot afford to subsidize, because their
profitability vi is low. In the former case, the decrease in
throughput is mainly due to a higher utilization of the sys-
tem, which will be relieved in the long term when the ISPs
expand capacities. Startup companies with low profits are of
the latter case. The decrease in throughput is mainly due to
the ISP’s high price that limits the user demand, and there-
fore, regulators might want to regulate ISP’s monopolistic
pricing or introduce competition, e.g., municipal infrastruc-
tures [25]. However, if they are promising, we also expect
that venture capital would provide the funding source for
them to subsidize their users and achieve their potential high
profitability. After all, we believe in a transparent and com-
petitive market where users can choose CPs based on quality
and prices, and the businesses drive the evolution of the In-
ternet ecosystem.
Although our analyses imply that a deregulation of sub-
sidization will provide CPs more freedom to subsidize and
increase the competitiveness of the content market, regula-
tors might still want to impose policies that prevent discrim-
inatory subsidization of the access ISPs. For example, Com-
cast’s Xbox XFinity [2] service enables its users to access
on-demand content on their Xbox devices, which does not
count against their 250GB data cap. By implicitly subsidiz-
ing their users, this service favors the ISP’s vertically inte-
grated business over other content competitors, e.g., Netflix.
Some CPs work with access ISPs to provide better services
and cheaper prices for their users, e.g., Google Apps for Ver-
izon [4]; however, this might also inversely affect the com-
petitors of those favored CPs. We believe that the subsidiza-
tion option should be identical, and should be given to all
CPs equally. Through this, the access ISPs would treat CPs
more neutrally and the subsidization would create a trans-
parent and uniform platform for the CPs to compete.
Our analytical framework is based on a macroscopic equi-
librium model that captures the interactions among an access
ISP, a set of CPs and end-users via the CPs’ subsidization
and the ISP’s capacity and pricing decisions. Our theoretical
results are mostly qualitative, which provides understand-
ing and predictions of the changes in the system states when
some of the driving factors change. The limitation is that it
might not be able to capture short-term off-equilibrium types
of system dynamics, where players’ decisions are not ratio-
nal or optimal. Our numerical evaluations are limited to a
styled model of CPs to capture qualitative trends; however,
more detailed experiments and validations could be chal-
lenging, because market data are needed so as to obtain the
characteristics of the CPs, e.g., their profitability and elas-
ticities, and an ISP needs to execute such a plan in the mar-
ket. With the emerging sponsored data plan from AT&T, we
expect this type of market data could be available for reg-
ulatory authorities as well as research communities. This
study focuses on a single access ISP; however, we believe
that competition between ISPs will also incentivize them to
adopt subsidization schemes, through which users can obtain
subsidized services. Finally, our result shows that under the
subsidization mechanism, the access ISP could increase uti-
lization and revenue, which will further provide investment
incentives for them to expand capacity. We do not have suf-
ficient space to study the ISP’s capacity planning decision in
detail, which is a direction of our future work.
7. CONCLUSIONS
The Internet is facing a dilemma of increasing traffic de-
mand and decreasing incentives for the access ISPs to ex-
pand capacity, because service prioritization and two-sided
pricing are not allowed under the net neutrality principles.
We propose to allow CPs to voluntarily subsidize the data
usage costs incurred at the access ISPs for their end-users.
Our solution modularizes the issue along the tussle bound-
ary such that the physical network is still kept neutral while
the innovative competition among CPs is enabled at higher
service layers. Through our macroscopic modeling and anal-
yses, we show that a deregulated subsidization policy will
incentivize highly profitable CPs to subsidize users and in-
crease the system welfare and the revenue of the access ISPs.
With the improved profit margins, the access ISPs would ob-
tain more investment incentives under subsidization. How-
ever, the deregulation of subsidization might trigger an ISP
to increase price, which would decrease the system welfare
as well as the throughput of startup CPs. We suggest that
price regulation might be needed if the access market is not
competitive enough and the price is too high. Because subsi-
dization creates a feedback channel for CPs to return value to
the access ISPs and realign the created value and investment
in the value chain, we believe that subsidization competition
could vitalize neutral Internet for the future.
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APPENDIX
A. PROOFS
Proof of Lemma 1: By Assumption 1, we know Θ(φ, µ)
is strictly increasing in φ and λi(φ) is strictly decreasing in
φ; therefore, g(φ) = Θ(φ, µ)−∑i∈N miλi(φ) is strictly in-
creasing in φ. Because limφ→0 Θ(φ, µ) = 0 and λi(0) > 0
for all i ∈ N , limφ→0g(φ) < 0; because limφ→∞ λi(φ) =
0 for all i ∈ N , limφ→∞g(φ) = limφ→∞Θ(φ, µ) > 0. As
a result, g(φ) = 0 must have a unique solution.
Finally, when g(φ) = 0, Θ(φ, µ) =
∑
i∈N miλi(φ),
which is equivalent to Equation (1) of Definition 1.
Proof of Lemma 2: Let κ = mj/mi. Given CP i’s char-
acterization λi(·), we verify that λj(φ) = κ−1λi(φ) for all
φ > 0. This is because when λj(0) = κ−1λi(0), the above
implies λjφ (φ) =
(
dλj
dφ
)(
φ
λj
)
=
(
1
κ
dλi
dφ
)(
φ
κ−1λi
)
= λiφ (φ)
for all φ > 0. Thus, θj(φ) = mjλj(φ) = κmiκ−1λi(φ) =
miλi(φ) = θi(φ) for all φ > 0. Finally, because given φ,
the throughput of CP i and j are the same, the system will
induce the same utilization φ, and therefore, φ is also the
unique system utilization when CP i is replaced by CP j.
Proof of Theorem 1: Because g(φ) is strictly increasing
in φ by Lemma 1 and by Equation (2), we have
dg
dφ
=
∂Θ
∂φ
−
∑
k∈N
mk
dλk
dφ
> 0.
When considering the capacity effect, we write the system
utilization φ(µ) as a function of the system capacity. By
Lemma 1, g(φ(µ)) = Θ(φ(µ), µ)−∑k∈N mkλk(φ(µ)) =
0. By taking derivative of µ on both sides, we obtain
∂Θ
∂φ
∂φ
∂µ
+
∂Θ
∂µ
−
∑
k∈N
mk
dλk
dφ
∂φ
∂µ
= 0,
which is equivalent to(
∂Θ
∂φ
−
∑
k∈N
mk
dλk
dφ
)
∂φ
∂µ
= −∂Θ
∂µ
or
dg
dφ
∂φ
∂µ
= −∂Θ
∂µ
.
Since Θ(φ, µ) is increasing in µ, ∂Θ/∂µ > 0, which implies
∂φ
∂µ
= −
(
dg
dφ
)−1
∂Θ
∂µ
< 0.
When considering the user effect, we write the system uti-
lization φ(m) as a function of the user populations. By
Lemma 1, g(φ(m)) = Θ(φ(m), µ)−∑k∈N mkλk(φ(m)) =
0. By taking derivative of mi on both sides, we obtain
∂Θ
∂φ
∂φ
∂mi
−
∑
k∈N
mk
dλk
dφ
∂φ
∂mi
− λi = 0,
which is equivalent to(
∂Θ
∂φ
−
∑
k∈N
mk
dλk
dφ
)
∂φ
∂mi
= λi or
dg
dφ
∂φ
∂mi
= λi.
Since dgdφ > 0, the above implies
∂φ
∂mi
=
(
dg
dφ
)−1
λi > 0.
Finally, the results for ∂θi/∂µ, ∂θi/∂mi and ∂θj/∂mi can
be derived by using θi(φ) = miλi(φ) and chain rules, and
applying the above results for ∂φ/∂µ and ∂φ/∂mi.
Proof of Theorem 2: When considering the price effect,
we write the system utilization φ(p) = φ(m(p)) as a func-
tion of the price. By Lemma 1, g(φ(p)) = Θ(φ(p), µ) −∑
k∈N mk(p)λk(φ(p)) = 0. By taking derivative of p on
both sides, we obtain
∂Θ
∂φ
∂φ
∂p
−
∑
k∈N
(
dmk
dp
λk +mk
dλk
dφ
∂φ
∂p
)
= 0,
which is equivalent to(
∂Θ
∂φ
−
∑
k∈N
mk
dλk
dφ
)
∂φ
∂p
=
∑
k∈N
dmk
dp
λk.
By Assumption 2, mk(p) is decreasing in p, which implies
∂φ
∂p
=
(
dg
dφ
)−1 ∑
k∈N
dmk
dp
λk ≤ 0.
By taking derivatives of p on θi(p) = mi(p)λi(φ(p)),
dθi
dp
> 0⇔ dmi
dp
λi +mi
dλi
dφ
∂φ
∂p
> 0,
which is equivalent to
1
mi
dmi
dp
> − 1
λi
dλi
dφ
∂φ
∂p
or mip /
λi
φ < −φp .
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Finally,
dθ
dp
=
∑
i∈N
dθi
dp
=
∑
i∈N
dmi
dp
λi +mi
dλi
dφ
∂φ
∂p
.
By substituting ∂φ/∂p of (5) into the above, we obtain
dθ
dp
=
∑
i∈N
dmi
dp
λi
(
1 +
(
dg
dφ
)−1 ∑
k∈N
dλk
dφ
mk
)
.
By substituting dg/dφ of (2) into the above, we obtain (6).
Proof of Lemma 3: Because s′i > si, t′i = p− s′i < p−
si = ti and by Assumption 2, m′i = mi(t
′
i) ≥ mi(ti) = mi.
By Theorem 1, we know that ∂φ/∂mi > 0, and there-
fore, φ(s′) ≥ φ(s). Also by Theorem 1, we know that
∂θi/∂mi > 0 and ∂θj/∂mi < 0 for all j 6= i. As a re-
sult, θi(s′) ≥ θi(s) and θj(s′) ≤ θj(s) for all j 6= i, which
implies Uj(s′) = vjθj(s′) ≤ vjθj(s) = Uj(s) for all j 6= i.
Proof of Theorem 3: If s is a Nash equilibrium, each si ∈
[0, q] maximizesUi(si; s−i) = (vi−si)mi(p−si)λi (φ (s)).
By Karush-Kuhn-Tucker condition, we can derive that
∂Ui
∂si
 ≤ 0 if si = 0;≥ 0 if si = q;
= 0 if 0 < si < q;
∀ i ∈ N . (18)
For CP i with si = 0, the above condition tells that
∂Ui
∂si
= (vi − si)∂θi
∂si
− θi = vi ∂θi
∂si
− θi ≤ 0.
By Lemma 3, we know ∂θi/∂si > 0 and the above implies
vi ≤ (∂θi/∂si)−1 θi. By taking partial derivatives of si on
Ui = (vi − si)miλi, we deduce that
∂Ui
∂si
= (vi − si)
(
mi
∂λi
∂si
+ λi
∂mi
∂si
)
−miλi.
Dividing miλi on both sides of (18), we have
(vi − si)
(
1
λi
∂λi
∂si
+
1
mi
∂mi
∂si
) ≤ 1 if si = 0;≥ 1 if si = q;
= 1 if 0 < si < q;
When we multiply si on both sides of the above, the left
hand side becomes
(vi−si)
(
misi + 
λi
si
)
= (vi−si)
(
misi + 
λi
φ 
φ
mi
mi
si
)
= τi(s).
When si = 0, τi(s) = 0 = si, and therefore, we have
τi(s)
{ ≥ si if si = q;
= si if 0 ≤ si < q, or si = min{τi(s), q}.
Finally, if Ui(s) is concave in si for all i ∈ N , local opti-
mality also guarantees the global optimality and therefore,
the above first order necessary conditions become sufficient
condition for s being a Nash equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 4: The condition (10) implies that
Ui(si; s−i) is concave in si for any s−i. Because the strat-
egy space [0, q] is compact, it guarantees the existence of
Nash equilibrium. Suppose there exists two distinct Nash
equilibria sˆ and s˜. By concavity of Ui(si; s−i) in si and the
maximum principle, for any i ∈ N and any xi ∈ [0, q],
(xi − sˆi)ui(ˆs) ≤ 0, and (xi − s˜i)ui(˜s) ≤ 0.
By substituting x = s˜ in the first inequality and x = sˆ in the
second inequality, we deduce for any i ∈ N ,
(s˜i − sˆi)ui(ˆs) ≤ 0, and (sˆi − s˜i)ui(˜s) ≤ 0.
By adding the above inequalities, we further deduce that
(s˜i − sˆi)(ui(ˆs)− ui(˜s)) ≤ 0, ∀i ∈ N .
The above is equivalent to (s˜i − sˆi)(ui(˜s)− ui(ˆs)) ≥ 0 for
all i ∈ N , which contradicts the condition (10).
Proof of Theorem 5: For any j ∈ N\{i}, we show that
(sˆj − sj) (uj (ˆs)− uj(s)) ≥ 0.
Because the above is symmetric in s and sˆ, without loss of
generality, we can consider the cases of sj ≤ sˆj . By using
the KKT condition of (18), we have the following four cases.
1. sj = sˆj : (sˆj − sj) (uj (ˆs)− uj(s)) = 0.
2. sj = 0 and sˆj ∈ (0, q): uj(s) < 0 and uj (ˆs) = 0; and
therefore, the above becomes sˆj (−uj(s)) ≥ 0.
3. sj = 0 and sˆj = q: uj(s) < 0 and uj (ˆs) > 0; and
therefore, the above becomes q (uj (ˆs)− uj(s)) ≥ 0.
4. sj ∈ (0, q) and sˆj = q: uj(s) = 0 and uj (ˆs) > 0; and
therefore, the above becomes (ˆq − sj)uj (ˆs) ≥ 0.
By the condition (10), we deduce (sˆi − si) (ui(ˆs)− ui(s)) <
0. Suppose sˆi < si, the above implies that ui(ˆs) > ui(s).
However, if sˆi < si, we must have si > 0 and by the KKT
condition of (18), we have ui(s) ≥ 0, which further implies
that ui(ˆs) > ui(s) ≥ 0. Again by the KKT condition of
(18), ui(ˆs) > 0 implies sˆ = q which contradicts with the
assumption sˆi < si. Consequently, we must have sˆi ≥ si.
Proof of Theorem 6: The condition (10) of Theorem
4 implies the local concavity of the utility functions. By
Proposition 1.4.2 of [14], the Nash equilibrium s can be
equivalently characterized as the solution of a variational in-
equality, denoted as V I(F,K), where F , −u and K ,
[0, q]|N |. s ∈ K is a solution of V I(F,K) if (x−s)TF (s) ≥
0 for all x ∈ K. We apply the sensitivity analysis [43, 12] of
variational inequalities to obtain the dynamics of the Nash
equilibrium s(p, q) as the price p or the policy q changes.
For each CP i, the constraint si ∈ [0, q] can be written as
two linear constraints g−i (s) , si ≥ 0 and g+i (s) , q−si ≥
0. For any s, the set of binding constraints are
G = {g−i (s) : i ∈ N−} ∪ {g+i (s) : i ∈ N+}. (19)
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Because N− ∩ N+ = ∅, the gradients of the binding con-
straints are linearly independent. Because ui(s) = 0 implies
si ∈ N˜ for all i ∈ N , by the KKT condition of (18), we
know that the strict complementary slackness condition of
Theorem 3.1 of [43] holds. By Theorem 4, the Nash equi-
librium is locally unique, and therefore, by Theorem 3.1 of
[43], in a neighborhood of (p, q), the Nash equilibrium can
be written as a differentiable function s(p, q).
Let m , |N−| + |N+| be the number of binding con-
straints. We define G as a m × n matrix, whose ith row is
the gradient of the ith binding constraint with respect to s.
We defineEp andEq asm×1 vectors, whose ith component
are the partial derivatives of the ith binding constraint with
respect to p and q, respectively. Following the framework of
[12], we define Q = GT (GGT )−1G and M to be an n×m
matrix satisfying MG = Q and QM = M . Given the set G
of linear constraints in (19), we can deduce that Q = {qij}
is a diagonal matrix satisfying qii = 1 if i /∈ N˜ and qii = 0
otherwise, and M = GT .
When q is the sensitivity parameter, Eq = {ej} satisfies
that ej = 1 if the jth constraint is a type of g+i (s) = q − si
constraint and ej = 0 otherwise. Because the constraints
G are linear, Theorem 3.1 of [12] implies that Q∇qs(q) =
−MEq and (I − Q)(∇sF∇qs(q) + ∇qF ) = 0. Because
when multiplying ∇qs(q) by Q, the values associated with
the non-binding strategies vanish, the first equation implies
∂si/∂q = 0, ∀i ∈ N− and ∂si/∂q = 1, ∀i ∈ N+. (20)
Because F , −u and u does not depend on q, the second
equation can be written as (I − Q)∇su∇qs = 0. Because
when multiplied by I − Q, the components associated with
the binding strategies vanish, by substituting (20) into the
above, we obtain∇s˜u˜∇q s˜+∇su˜Eq = 0. By the condition
(10) of Theorem 4, we deduce that F , −u is a P -function
[27]. If we restrict to the CPs in N˜ , we know that the Ja-
cobian ∇s˜(−u˜) is a P -matrix [27], which is always non-
singular. Therefore, we deduce∇q s˜ = −(∇s˜u˜)−1∇su˜Eq =
−Ψ∇su˜Eq , the same as the third case of (11).
When taking p as the sensitivity parameter and applying
Theorem 3.1 of [12], we can obtainQ∇ps(p) = −MEp and
(I −Q)(∇sF∇ps(p) +∇pF ) = 0. Because the constraints
in G do not depend on p, Ep is a zero vector, therefore, the
first equation implies that ∂si/∂p = 0 for all i /∈ N˜ . By
substituting F , −u into the second equation, we have
(I − Q)(∇su∇ps + ∇pu) = 0. Similarly, by substitut-
ing ∂si/∂p = 0 for all i /∈ N˜ into the above, we obtain
∇s˜u˜∇ps˜ + ∇pu˜ = 0. Because ∇s˜(−u˜) is non-singular, it
is equivalent to the second case of (12) in a matrix form as
∇ps˜ = −(∇s˜u˜)−1∇pu˜ = −Ψ∇pu˜.
Proof of Corollary 1: By (11) of Theorem 6, ∂si/∂q ≥ 0
is immediate for i /∈ N˜ . For the CPs in N˜ , by Theorem 6,
we have ∇q s˜ = −(∇s˜u˜)−1∇su˜Eq = −Ψ∇su˜Eq . Because
u is off-diagonally monotone, we know that ∇s˜(−u˜) is a
P -matrix with non-positive off-diagonal entries or an M -
matrix [35], which implies that all the entries of−Ψ are non-
negative. By Theorem 6, we know that∇su˜Eq is a vector of
{∂ui/∂sj : i ∈ N˜ , j ∈ N+}. Because u is off-diagonally
monotone, the components of ∇su˜Eq are all non-negative,
and therefore, ∇q s˜ = −Ψ∇su˜Eq ≥ 0.
Now we have shown that ∂si/∂q ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N . Since
all the subsidies are monotonic, by Lemma 3, we deduce
that ∂φ/∂q ≥ 0. Finally, because the ISP’s revenue can be
written as R = pΘ(φ, µ) and ∂Θ(φ, µ)/∂φ ≥ 0, we have
∂R
∂q
=
∂R
∂φ
∂φ
∂q
= p
∂Θ(φ, µ)
∂φ
∂φ
∂q
≥ 0.
Proof of Theorem 7: By Equation (4) and (5), we deduce
∂φ
∂p
=
∂φ
∂mi
1
λi
∑
j∈N
∂mj
∂p
λj , ∀i ∈ N .
By substituting the above into
∂θi
∂p
=
∂mi
∂p
λi +mi
dλi
dp
∂φ
∂p
,
we obtain
∂θi
∂p
=
∂mi
∂p
λi +mi
dλi
dp
∂φ
∂mi
1
λi
∑
j∈N
∂mj
∂p
λj , or
θip θi =p
∂θi
∂p
=
p
mi
∂mi
∂p
θi +mi
dλi
dp
∂φ
∂mi
1
λi
∑
j∈N
p
mj
∂mj
∂p
θj
=mip θi + 
φ
mi
λi
φ
∑
j∈N
mjp θj
Because R(p) = p
∑
i∈N θi(p), the marginal revenue is
dR
dp
=
∑
i∈N
θi + p
∑
i∈N
∂θi
∂p
=
∑
i∈N
θi +
∑
i∈N
θip θi
=
∑
i∈N
θi +
∑
i∈N
mip θi + 
φ
mi
λi
φ
∑
j∈N
mjp θj
=
∑
i∈N
θi +
∑
i∈N
mip θi +
∑
i∈N
φmi
λi
φ
∑
j∈N
mjp θj
=
∑
i∈N
θi + Υ
∑
i∈N
mip θi.
Proof of Theorem 8: By Theorem 6, the Nash equilib-
rium is locally unique, i.e., si(q) , si (p(q), q), we deduce
dsi
dq
=
∂si
∂q
+
∂si
∂p
dp
dq
. (21)
Thus, we can obtain (15) by substituting the above into
dmi
dq
=
dmi
dti
dti
dq
=
dmi
dti
(
dp
dq
− dsi
dq
)
.
Similarly, we can obtain (16) by substituting (4) into
∂φ
∂q
=
∑
i∈N
∂φ
∂mi
dmi
dq
.
Finally,
∂θi
∂q
> 0 can be written as
dmi
dq
λi+mi
dλi
dφ
dφ
dq
> 0.
By Assumption 1, λiφ < 0 and because 
θi
q = 
mi
q + 
λi
q =
15
tiq 
mi
ti + 
φ
q 
λi
φ and ∂θi/∂q > 0 is equivalent to 
θi
q > 0,
θiq > 0⇔ tiq miti > −φq λiφ ⇔ tiq miti /λiφ < −φq .
Proof of Corollary 2: Because W (q) ,
∑
i∈N θi(q)vi,
dW
dq
=
∑
i∈N
mi
dλi
dq
vi +
∑
i∈N
λi
dmi
dq
vi.
By substituting wi , λi dmidq and (16) into the above,
dW
dq
=
∑
i∈N
mi
dλi
dφ
dφ
dq
vi +
∑
i∈N
wivi
=
∑
i∈N
mi
dλi
dφ
(
dg
dφ
)−1∑
j∈N
wj
 vi + ∑
i∈N
wivi.
Because dφ/dq > 0, by (16) we know that
∑
j∈N wj > 0.
Therefore, dW/dq > 0 is equivalent to∑
i∈N
mi
dλi
dφ
(
dg
dφ
)−1
vi +
∑
i∈N
wi∑
j∈N wj
vi > 0.
By substituting (dg/dφ)−1 = λ−1i
∂φ
∂mi
into the above,∑
i∈N
mi
λi
dλi
dφ
∂φ
∂mi
vi +
∑
i∈N
wi∑
j∈N wj
vi > 0,
which is equivalent to
∑
i∈N
wi∑
k∈N wk
vi >
∑
i∈N −λimivi.
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